This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be characterized by a stability condition that is adapted to the institutional constraints of the German system.
Introduction
According to German legislation, every student who obtains the Abitur (i.e., successfully finishes secondary school) or some equivalent qualification is entitled to study any subject at any public university. Given capacity constraints at educational institutions and the ensuing need to reject some applicants, this principle has long been reinterpreted as meaning that everyone should have a chance of being admitted into the program of his or her choice. In order to implement this requirement, places in those fields of study that are most prone to overdemand have been allocated by a centralized nationwide assignment procedure for over 25 years. In the first part of this paper I analyze the most recent version of this procedure that is currently used to allocate places for medicine and three specialities (dentistry, pharmacy, and veterinary medicine). In the winter term 2010/2011 more than 56 000 students applied for one of the less than 13 000 places available in these four subjects, meaning that ultimately one in four applicants had to be rejected. What sets this part of my study apart from previous investigations of real-life centralized clearinghouses is the sequential nature of the German admissions procedure: In the first step, the well known Boston mechanism is used to allocate up to 40 percent of the total capacity of each university among special applicant groups, consisting of applicants who have either obtained excellent school grades or have had to wait a long time since finishing school. About one month later, all remaining places -this includes in particular all places that could have been but were not allocated to special student groups -are assigned among remaining applicants according to criteria chosen by the universities using the college (university) proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (CDA). Applicants belonging to special student groups, who were not assigned one of the seats initially reserved for them, have another chance of obtaining a seat in this part of the procedure. Despite the complexities of the admissions procedure and the strategic incentives induced by it, I show that, under reasonable assumptions, the set of (complete information) equilibrium outcomes can be characterized by a stability condition with respect to the true preferences of participants. The concept of stability used here differs from the previous literature since it accounts for the fact that (i) each university has different types of places (corresponding to the places allocated in the different parts of the procedure) with differing admissions criteria, and (ii) vacant seats can be redistributed across quotas. I show that, even in the absence of information asymmetries, the procedure supports Pareto dominated equilibrium outcomes (with respect to the true preferences of applicants).
Motivated by this finding, I develop an alternative assignment procedure in the second part of my paper. For the redesign I interpret the current procedure's sequential design as reflecting the constraint that 40 percent of the total capacity of each university should initially be reserved for special student groups (excellent and wait-time applicants) and should be allocated on basis of universities' criteria if (and only if) there is insufficient demand from these groups. 1 Similar constraints can play an important part in applications to school choice: For example, schools are sometimes required to offer guaranteed access to specific student groups, 2 and may have preferences over how any potentially remaining capacity should be distributed among applicants (e.g. a strict preference for an equal distribution among sexes). Any mechanism that implements such constraints by sequentially allocating parts of the total capacity, such as the current German procedure, and that depends on submitted preferences in a reasonable way, e.g.
by producing a stable matching, necessarily induces incentives to manipulate the assignment procedure. Given that incentive compatibility is an important goal, it is thus important to study when and how complex constraints of the above type can be implemented by mechanisms that simultaneously assign all available places and achieve a satisfactory allocative performance. To study these questions in sufficient generality, I introduce a model of matching with complex constraints, where college preferences are given by choice protocols that can be thought of as an explicit representation of how a college chooses from a given set of applicants. Abstracting from details, a choice protocol consists of (i) a sequence in which student groups are to be considered, and (ii) an associated sequence of capacities, which, for each point of the sequence, describes how many places can be allocated as a function of the numbers of seats left empty by previously considered groups. I introduce a concept of procedural stability for this class of matching problems and show that as long as choice protocols satisfy two simple restrictions of monotonicity and consistency, a student optimal procedurally stable matching always exists and the associated direct mechanism (group) strategyproof for students. These results rest on 1 While some changes to the current quota system may be feasible, at least the quota for applicants with a long waiting time is generally seen as necessary. It ensures that that every applicant with the necessary qualification (i.e. finishing secondary school) has a chance to study any subject she wants. This has been put forth as a basic requirement for university admissions by the German constitutional court in its Numerus Clausus Urteil from 1972. 2 Most public schools in Boston have to admit any student with an older sibling already attending the school (see Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2006 ), while some public schools in New York City have to admit all students whose performance in a standardized English language exam is among the top 2 percent (see Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2009 ).
a transformation of a matching problem with complex constraints to an associated "standard" two-sided matching problem, where constraints are not explicitly present, for which well known results (see Section 2 for references) apply. In case of the German admissions system, procedural stability reduces to the stability notion that characterizes complete information equilibrium outcomes of the current admissions procedure studied in the first part of this paper. The choice protocols needed to implement the constraints of the German admissions system turn out to be monotonic and consistent. Hence, a redesign based on the above ideas would provide (groups of) applicants with dominant strategy incentives to submit preferences truthfully and would thus lead to an assignment procedure that Pareto dominates all equilibrium outcomes of the current procedure with respect to applicants' true preferences.
Related Literature
Complementary to the analysis of this paper, Braun et al. (2010) study the German university admissions system from an empirical perspective. Using data for the winter term 2006/2007, for which the rules of the centralized admissions procedure were slightly different from the rules of the procedure analyzed here, they find considerable support for the hypothesis that applicants try to manipulate the centralized admissions procedure. My paper, which was drafted independently of this empirical study, complements this research since it shows precisely how these findings can be explained by applicants' strategic incentives. A major benefit of the more theoretical approach is that I am not only able to design a promising alternative but can also compare it directly to the equilibrium outcomes of the current procedure.
Given that the German admissions system and my proposal for a redesign are closely related to the deferred acceptance algorithms and the Boston mechanism, the theoretical and applied literatures on these mechanisms are of course related to this paper. Excellent comprehensive surveys of some of these applications are Roth and Sotomayor (1990) , Roth (2008) and Sönmez andÜnver (2010).
Variants of the college proposing deferred acceptance (CDA) algorithms have been used to allocate medical students to their first professional position in the US ; see Roth and Peranson 1999 for an account of the efforts to redesign the resident matching procedure) and to assign students to public universities in Turkey (Balinski and Sönmez 1999 The Boston mechanism has been studied extensively since Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez's (2003) seminal paper on school choice mechanisms. Ergin and Sönmez (2006) show that if each school has a strict priority ranking of all potential students, the set of complete information equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of stable matchings with respect to the true preferences of participants. Pathak and Sönmez (2008) show that when some students are naive in the sense that they always submit preferences truthfully, equilibrium outcomes of the Boston mechanism coincide with the set of matchings that are stable for a modified economy in which naive students lose their priorities to students who behave strategically. Chen and Sönmez (2006) and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) provide experimental and empirical evidence that students or their parents try to manipulate the Boston mechanism and that strategic behavior can lead to welfare losses. A more positive perspective on the Boston mechanism is provided by Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) who show that when schools have no priorities and all students have the same ordinal preferences but differ in their (privately known) preference intensities, any symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Boston mechanism weakly ex-ante Pareto dominates the SDA mechanism with any symmetric tie-breaking rule. Arguments in support of the Boston mechanism in similar environments are also provided by Miralles (2008) and Featherstone and Niederle (2008) . While the results in favor of the Boston mechanism are certainly relevant for school choice problems, were priorities are typically very coarse, they are arguably less so for my application to university admissions since evaluation criteria such as average grades or standardized tests typically yield a much finer ranking of students.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first study of a dynamic assignment procedure that combines the Boston and deferred acceptance algorithms. 3 Apart from the practical relevance of this study for the current German admissions system, redesigning it poses new theoretical challenges due to its complex constraints and the proposed solutions yield new insights that are applicable outside of the specific context of the German system.
Additional literature is reviewed in context below (see the next section and section 5.1, where I compare matching problems with complex constraints to the existing literature on matching problems with constraints).
Organization of the paper
In section 2, I introduce three known matching algorithms that are important for the analysis.
Section 3 contains a description of the current admissions procedure for German universities.
In section 4, I analyze the revelation game induced by this procedure. Section 5 introduces a theory of matching with complex constraints and then shows how this theory can be applied to develop a redesign of the German admissions system. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix. An additional Online Appendix contains some omitted proofs as well as details and data on the current procedure.
Basic model and assignment algorithms
A college admissions problem consists of
• a finite set of students I
• a finite set of colleges C,
• a profile of student preferences P I = (P i ) i∈I , where P i is a strict ordering of C ∪ {i}, and
• a profile of college preferences P C = (P c ) c∈C , where P c is a strict ordering of 2 I .
Given a strict ordering P i for a student i ∈ I, let R i denote the associated weak ordering, that is, cR i c if and only either cP i c or c = c . Define associated weak orderings for colleges analogously. College c is acceptable to student i according to P i , if cP i i, and group of students J is acceptable to college c according to P c if JP c ∅. For all mechanisms that are considered in this paper, it is sufficient to assume that students' and colleges' preferences over acceptable (sets of) partners are strict.
A matching is a mapping µ from I ∪C into itself such that (1) for all students i, µ(i) ∈ C ∪{i} for all i ∈ I, (2) for all colleges c, µ(c) ⊆ I, and (3) i ∈ µ(c) if and only if µ(i) = c. I make the usual assumption that agents only care about their own partner(s) in a matching so that their preferences over matchings coincide with their preferences over (sets of) potential partners.
The sets of students and colleges are assumed to be fixed so that a college admissions problem is given by a profile of student and college preferences P = (P I , P C ). Given c's strict ordering P c , its choice from J ⊆ I, denoted Ch c (J|P c ), is the P c -most preferred subset of J.
The key allocative criterion in the literature is (pairwise) stability as introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). Given a college admissions problem P , a matching µ is pairwise stable if (1) no student is matched to an unacceptable college, that is, for all i ∈ I, µ(i)R i i, (2) no college prefers to reject some of its assigned students, that is, Ch c (µ(c)) = µ(c), and (3) there is no student-college pair that blocks µ, that is, there is no pair (i, c) such that cP i µ(i) and
Next, I introduce three important restrictions on college preferences over groups of students.
College c's strict ranking P c (c) is responsive (Roth 1985) , if there is a strict ordering P * c of I ∪ {c} and a quota q c ∈ N such that (c1) ∅P c J for all J ⊆ I such that |J| > q c , and (c2) for all J ⊆ I with |J| < q c and all i, j ∈ I \ J, J ∪ {i}P c J ∪ {j} if and only if iP * c j and J ∪ {i}P c J if and only if iP An important special case of the college admissions problem with responsive preferences is the priority based allocation problem in which colleges' rankings of individual students and their capacities are exogenously assigned. The interpretation here is that colleges are merely "objects" to be consumed by students (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez 2003, p. 733 ) and that their rankings of individual students are imposed on them by laws and regulations. In particular, a colleges' ranking of individual students does not represent its preferences and thus has no intrinsic meaning for welfare evaluations. To emphasize this important interpretational difference, college c's strict ranking of I ∪ {c} will be called a priority ranking and denoted by c if we are dealing with a priority based allocation problem.
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A (direct) matching mechanism is a mapping f from the set of feasible preference profiles to the set of possible matchings. In a college admissions problem, the set of feasible preference profiles consists of all preference profiles of colleges and students that satisfy appropriate restrictions (e.g. substitutability or responsiveness). In a priority based allocation problem, the "preferences" of colleges are fixed, so that the set of feasible preference profiles consists of all profiles of student preferences. Given a matching mechanism f and a feasible preference profile P , f i (P ) denotes the assignment of agent i ∈ I ∪ C. A matching mechanism f is stable, if it selects a stable matching for each profile in its domain. A matching mechanism f is group strategyproof for students, if for all feasible preference profiles P and all sets of students J ⊆ I, there is no joint manipulation P J = (P j ) j∈J such that f j (P J , P −J )P j f j (P ) for all j ∈ J. If this condition holds for all singleton subsets of students, f is strategyproof for students. I now describe three assignment procedures that play an important role in the literature and the remainder of this paper.
The student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
The student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (SDA), developed by Gale and Shapley (1962) (and extended to college admission problems with substitutable preferences by Roth and Sotomayor 1990), will play an important role in my proposal for a redesign of the German admission system and proceeds as follows In the first round, every student applies to her favorite acceptable college. Each college c temporarily accepts its choice from the set of applicants in this round and rejects all other applicants.
In the tth round, every student applies to her most preferred acceptable college (if any) among those that have not rejected her in any previous round of the algorithm.
Each college c temporarily accepts its choice from the set of applicants in this round and rejects all other applicants.
The following result summarizes the main properties of this algorithm. (i) If all colleges have substitutable preferences, f I (P ) is the most preferred stable matching for all students and the least preferred stable matching for all colleges.
(ii) If, in addition, colleges' preferences satisfy the law of aggregate demand, f I is group strategyproof for students.
The college proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
The college proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (CDA) lets colleges take an active role. This algorithm plays an important role in the current German admission procedure and proceeds as follows:
In the first round, each college offers admission to its choice from the set of all students. Each student i temporarily holds on to her most preferred offer and rejects all other offers. 5 The reference for the theorem is to the most general version of the result that I will use. Student optimality of the SDA was first established by Gale and Shapley (1962) and then later extended to matching problems with substitutable preferences in . Strategyproofness of the SDA for the proposing side was first established independently by Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) . Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) then extended this result to matching problems (with contracts) for which college preferences are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. For the same setting, Hatfield and Kojima (2009) showed that these assumptions actually guarantee group strategyproofness.
In the tth round, each college offers admission to its choice from the set of all students that have not rejected one of its offers in previous round. Each student i temporarily holds on to her most preferred offer and rejects all other offers.
Given a feasible preference profile P , let f C (P ) denote the matching chosen by the CDA.
The following result summarizes the most important properties of this procedure.
Theorem B (Kelso and Crawford 1982, Sotomayor 2007). For any preference profile P such that colleges' preferences are substitutable, (i) the matching f C (P ) is the most preferred stable matching for all colleges and the least preferred stable matching for all students.
(ii) the set of pure strategy complete information Nash equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation game induced by f C (·, P C ) coincides with the set of stable matchings with respect to P .
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The Boston mechanism
The Boston mechanism is a popular real-life assignment procedure for priority based allocation problems. Given the fixed priority structure C and a profile of strict student preferences P I , the following algorithm is used to determine assignments
In the first round, every student applies to her top choice college. Each college c admits the q c highest priority students who apply in this round (or all those students if there are fewer than q c ). All other students are rejected. Let q 2 c denote the remaining capacity of college c.
In the tth round, every remaining student applies to her tth most preferred acceptable college (if any). Each college c admits the q t c highest priority students who apply in this round (or all those students if there are fewer than q t c ). All other students are rejected. Let q t+1 c denote the remaining capacity of college c.
Fix a priority structure C and given some profile of student preferences P I , let f B (P I ) denote the matching chosen by the Boston mechanism. The following result summarizes the most important properties of this procedure.
Theorem C (Ergin and Sönmez 2006). For any profile of student preferences P I , (i) f B (P I ) is efficient with respect to P I .
(ii) the set of pure strategy complete information Nash equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism coincides with the set of stable matchings with respect to P I .
Note that the second part of this result implies that for any equilibrium outcome of the Boston mechanism, all students weakly prefer the outcome of the SDA under truth-telling. An example in Ergin and Sönmez (2006) shows that this dominance relation does not carry over to the case of incomplete information. As pointed out by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) , the Boston mechanism is not strategyproof since it gives some students strong incentives to over-report their preferences for some colleges.
The German university admissions system
The centralized admissions procedure for public universities in Germany is used to allocate places in human medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and pharmacy. 7 There is a separate assignment procedure for each subject and each applicant can take part in at most one of these assignment procedures. The assignment procedures are identical for all specialities and consist of three parts that are conducted sequentially:
1. In the first part, up to twenty percent of total capacity is allocated among applicants with an exceptional qualification, that is, an excellent average grade in school leaving examinations.
2. In the second part, up to twenty percent of total capacity is allocated among applicants with an exceptionally long waiting time, that is, a long time since obtaining their highschool degree. 
3.
In the third part, all remaining places, in particular all remaining seats from the first two parts, are allocated according to universities' preferences among those applicants not assigned in the first two parts of the procedure.
While there is no significant difference between the times at which parts 1 and 2 are conducted, the assignment procedure for the third part takes place more than one month after the assignments for the first two parts have been determined (to provide universities with enough time to evaluate remaining applicants). Since assignment procedures for different subjects are separate and applicants can participate in at most one of these procedures, the analysis will focus on the assignment procedure for one subject in the following. Of course, the current assignment procedure has additional problems, if applicants are not set on studying one of the subjects offered. For example, applicants' preferences may be driven primarily by the location of universities. I abstract from these concerns in the following.
Let A be the set of applicants and U denote the set of universities. In order to participate in the centralized assignment procedure applicants have to submit one ordered (preference) list of universities for each part of the procedure. There is no consistency requirement across the three lists and the list submitted for part t ∈ {1, 2, 3} is used only to determine assignments in part t. All preference lists are submitted simultaneously before any assignments are determined.
For the first and third part of the procedure at most six universities can be ranked, while for the second part any number of universities can be ranked. Let
a ) denote the profile of strict preference lists submitted by applicant a ∈ A and Q A = (Q a ) a∈A denote the profile of reports by all applicants. An applicant applies for a place in part t, if she ranks at least one university for part t of the procedure. Let q u denote the total number of places that university u has to offer. To avoid integer problems, I assume that all capacities are multiples of five. Let q
u∈U q u denote the number of places at university u and the total number of places available in the first two parts of the procedure. With these preparations, the German admissions procedure can be described as follows. (iv) lottery. 9 Select the q 1 highest ranked applicants in this ordering.
(Assignment) Apply the Boston mechanism to determine assignments of selected applicants:
University u can admit at most q 1 u applicants, the preference relation of a selected applicant a is Q (Assignment) Apply the Boston mechanism to determine assignments of selected applicants:
University u can admit at most q 2 u applicants, the preference relation of a selected applicant a is Q 2 a , and an applicant's priority for a university is determined lexicographically by (i) social criteria, (ii) average grade,(iii) lottery. Denote the matching produced in part 2 by f G2 (Q A ), the set of admitted applicants by A 2 , the number of empty seats at university q u + r (u,1) + r (u,2) be the number of remaining seats at university u. Each university u submits a strict ranking Q u of A 3 ∪ {u}, where uQ u a means that u prefers leaving a place unfilled rather than admitting
(Assignment) Apply the university proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to determine an assignment of applicants in A 3 to universities: University u can admit at most q 3 u applicants, the preference relation of an applicant a ∈ A 3 is given by Q 3 a , and u's preferences are responsive to Q u . Denote the matching produced in the third part of the procedure
Given a profile Q = (Q A , Q U ) of reports by applicants and universities, let f First, in which part an applicant is admitted at a given university is irrelevant for an applicant's studies. The only difference between being assigned in the first two parts or the third part is that assignments in the former are determined more than one month earlier. Second, while a university only evaluates those applicants who are not assigned in the first two parts of the admission procedure, it has to announce the rules of its evaluation process prior to the application deadline for prospective students. Many German universities use evaluation procedures that rely only on characteristics of applicants that are known prior to the application deadline, such as average grades, completion of on-the-job training, and so on (see section 4.1 and the Online Appendix for more details on this). In such cases, say that a university has an objective evaluation procedure to underline that it does not rely on a subjective criteria, such as performance in interviews. If u has an objective evaluation procedure, we can think of its evaluation process as being represented by a strict ranking (u,3) of all applicants (and the option of leaving a place unfilled) such that for any subset of applicants B ⊆ A, who are left in the admissions procedure by the beginning of the third part, u's submitted ranking is (u,3) | B .
In case of objective evaluation procedures, I will write
emphasize that universities' preferences for the third part of the admissions procedure are fixed.
An example
Suppose that A = {a 1 , . . . , a 9 } and U = {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 }. For simplicity, assume that each university has three places to allocate among students and that one place at each university is available in all three parts of the assignment procedure. 11 Applicants are indexed in increasing order of their average grades, so that a i has the ith best average grade among a 1 , . . . , a 9 . I assume that there are no ties in average grades. The applicants with the longest waiting times are assumed to be a 7 , a 8 , a 9 .
Next, I specify the priorities for the first two parts of the procedure and universities' rankings of applicants for the third part of the procedure. Given the above assumptions, applicants a 1 , a 2 , a 3 will be selected for the first part of the procedure provided that they apply for a place and for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} each university will assign ith highest priority to a i . For the second part, applicants a 7 , a 8 , a 9 will be selected provided they apply and I assume that priority orders of the three universities are as follows
This notation means that applicant a 8 has the highest, a 7 has the second highest, and a 9 has the third highest priority for a place at u 1 in part 2. The other rows and the following tables have analogous interpretations. For the third part, assume that universities have objective evaluation procedures that are represented by the following (true) rankings of applicants
Finally, applicants' (true) preferences are as follows 11 It is unproblematic to enlarge the example so that each university's capacity is some multiple of five. Larger examples do not facilitate understanding of the assignment procedure and all points made below apply equally well to larger, more realistic settings.
I now calculate the assignment chosen by the German admissions procedure under the assumption that all participants submit their preferences truthfully for each step of the procedure.
This assumption is made for illustrative purposes only and as we will shortly see, applicants can in fact profit from misrepresenting their preferences. In the above example, the German admissions procedure yields the following assignments
Before analyzing applicants' incentives, I first discuss the welfare and stability properties of the assignments chosen by the German admissions procedure. If we consider the first part of the procedure in isolation from the other parts, the chosen assignment is efficient with respect to the preferences of a 1 , a 2 , a 3 (this also follows directly from Theorem C.(i)). The same is true for the assignment chosen in the second part. However, a 8 and a 2 would both benefit if they were allowed to trade their places. Hence, even when applicants submit preferences truthfully, the assignments chosen in the first two parts of the admissions procedure are not necessarily efficient with respect to reported preferences of applicants assigned in parts 1 and 2. At the same time, the assignments in the first two parts are not stable with respect to the assumed priority structure and the preferences of eligible applicants. For example, even though a 2 has strictly higher priority for u 3 than a 3 in part 1, she is assigned a less preferred university because she applies to u 3 "too late". Finally, the assignment chosen in the third part is the college optimal stable matching in a matching problem with participants a 4 , a 5 , a 6 , u 1 , u 2 , u 3
given the preferences specified above.
Regarding the incentives of applicants, it is easy to see that applicants a 2 , a 5 , and a 8 could all secure a place at a more preferred university within the part of the procedure that they were assigned in. For example, applicant a 2 would obtain a place at her second most preferred university u 3 in part 1 of the procedure if only she had ranked it first. While these problems are known (cf Theorem C), applicant a 2 could do even better than securing a place at u 3 in the first part: Suppose that a 2 truncated her ranking and declared only u 1 as acceptable for all parts of the procedure. Assuming all others continue to submit their preferences truthfully, applicants a 2 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 will remain in the procedure by the beginning of the third part, while the assignments of the other applicants is left unchanged. This implies in particular that the one place at u 2 initially reserved for applicants with excellent average grades is left unassigned in the first part and thus becomes available again in the third part of the procedure. It is easy to see that the assignment chosen in the third part of the procedure is then
Hence, a 2 can obtain a place at her most preferred university u 1 if she declares all other universities unacceptable. This suggests that in particular for applicants who can expect to be eligible for the first part of the procedure, finding an optimal application strategy is more difficult than in a one-shot application of the Boston mechanism: Such applicants first need
to figure out what the best possible assignment is that they could get in the first part of the procedure. As in the example above, achieving this best possible assignment will often involve over-reporting preferences for some universities. This part of an applicant's optimization program is exactly the same as in a one-shot application of the Boston mechanism. However, in the German admissions system applicants face an additional problem since they also have to consider the trade-off between being assigned in the first part of the procedure and participating in the third part of the procedure. As seen above, truncating preferences increases the chances of participating in the third part, where an even better assignment might be obtained. This is, however, often risky since applicants who fail to secure a place in the first part lose their guaranteed priority over others. In the next section, I analyze this trade-off and characterize equilibrium outcomes of revelation game induced by the German admissions procedure.
Analysis of the current procedure
The example in the last section showed that applicants sometimes have strong incentives to manipulate the German admissions procedure by submitting a ranking of universities that does not correspond to their true preferences. Strategic behavior is encouraged by the ability to submit different preference lists for the three parts of the procedure since study conditions are the same no matter in which part of the procedure an applicant receives a place at a given university. Furthermore, applicants are explicitly advised that stating preferences truthfully may not be in their best interest. On the official website of the administrator of the centralized procedure, www.hochschulstart.de, applicants are cautioned that (1) for the first two parts, their chances of admission at a university may significantly decrease if they do not rank it at the top, and (2) act upon the incentives to manipulate the admissions procedure. 12 In particular, a significant percentage of applicants reported different preference lists for the three parts of the procedure.
In order to evaluate the performance of the university admissions system it is thus important to analyze the strategic incentives induced by the assignment procedure. In this section, I
provide a full characterization of (complete information) Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the revelation game induced by the current assignment procedure. Given the complex nature of the centralized admission procedure this necessitates several assumptions, which I introduce and motivate in the next subsection.
Modelling the revelation game
Throughout the analysis I assume that all universities have objective evaluation procedures.
In particular, for each university u there is a strict ranking Since the announcement of an evaluation procedure is binding, there is no room for strategizing once the rules for evaluating applicants have been announced. Under the assumption of objective evaluation procedures we are thus justified to think of the centralized admissions procedure as inducing a revelation game in which only applicants are strategic players. 13 I assume that this is a game of complete information, so that in particular applicants' preferences and universities' rankings are common knowledge. While this is certainly a strong assumption, data on previous outcomes of the admissions procedure are publicly available on the website of the centralized procedure's administrator. Assuming some stationarity, this provides applicants with relatively detailed information on the environment.
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The third assumption is that all applicants submit a non-empty list for all parts of the procedure and that an applicant can be eligible for a place in at most one of the first two parts.
While this is not without loss of generality, as there are rare cases in which it can be in an applicant's best interest to list no university for some part of the procedure (an example can be found in the Online Appendix), the empirical evidence in Braun et al. (2010) offers strong support in favor of the first part of the assumption. Given that all potentially eligible applicants always apply for a place in the respective part of the procedure, it is reasonable to assume that excellent applicants will not be eligible for a place reserved for wait-time applicants, since all universities (have to) rely partly on the average grades of applicants. Applicants with excellent average grades will typically find a place to study before they would become eligible in the wait- 13 More formally, under this assumption the admissions procedure induces a sequential revelation game where in the first stage universities choose their evaluation procedures and in the second stage applicants choose their application strategies. My analysis focusses on the second stage of this revelation game. While there is ample evidence that applicants behave strategically, I have not been able to find evidence suggesting that strategic considerations play an important role for universities' choices of evaluation procedures.
14 While the assumption of complete information becomes less compelling without the assumption of objective evaluation procedures, no university relies exclusively on subjective criteria for its evaluation process. In particular, it is required that in the determination of an applicant's position [in universities' rankings] average grade has to be a decisive factor (Merkblatt M09: Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen, http://hochschulstart.de/fileadmin/downloads/Merkblaetter/M09.pdf; translation by the author). This should allow applicants to form relatively reliable estimates of universities' preferences, so that the subsequent analysis should, to some extent, remain valid even when the partly subjective nature of evaluation procedures is acknowledged.
time quota, where the minimal waiting time to be eligible ranges from 2.5 years (veterinary medicine) to 5 years (general medicine). The above assumption ensures that priorities in the tth part of the procedure (t ∈ {1, 2}) can be summarized by a single strict ranking (u,t) of A ∪ {u} such that (i) a (u,t) u if and only if a is selected in the tth part of the procedure when all applicants apply for a place, 15 and (ii) a (u,t) b if and only if a ranks higher than b with respect to the criteria of the assignment stage in part t. An acceptable applicant with respect to (u,1) ( (u,2) ) will be called a top-grade applicant (wait-time applicant) in the following.
Finally, I assume that applicants have lexicographic preferences over potential assignments produced by the centralized procedure: Each applicant is primarily concerned with university the university that is assigned to her, but, given that two assignments yield the same university, has a strict preference for being assigned as as early as possible. This is reasonable since assignments in the priority based part are determined more than one month before the twosided part is conducted (to give universities enough time to evaluate applicants). Since study conditions do not depend on the particular part of the procedure in which an applicant is admitted by a given university, the additional time to search for an apartment, prepare to move, and so on, motivates strict preference for early assignment. To formalize this idea, I first define an outcome of the centralized procedure.
Definition 1.
An outcome of the centralized admissions procedure is a three-tuple of matchings µ = (µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ) such that (i) for t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, µ t is a matching of applicants and universities,
(ii) for t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, capacity constraints of part t are respected, i.e. r (u,t) (µ) ≥ 0 for all t, where for t ∈ {1, 2}, r (u,t) (µ) = q u + r (u,1) (µ) + r (u,2) (µ),
and
(ii) each student is matched to at most one university, that is,
Given an outcome of the centralized procedure µ = (µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ), applicant a's assignment under µ, µ(a), is u if, for some t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, µ t (a) = u, and a if for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, µ t (a) = a.
The assumption of lexicographic preferences means that applicant a has a strict ranking P a of U ∪ {a} such that she strictly prefers an outcome (of the centralized procedure) µ over an outcomeμ if and only if either she is assigned a strictly P a preferred university under µ, i.e.
µ
µ t (a) =μ 3 (a) = u for some u ∈ U and a t ∈ {1, 2}.
For the convenience of the reader and for future reference, the following is a list of my assumptions.
(A1) Objective evaluation procedures (A2) Complete information (A3) Non-empty preference lists and disjoint sets of eligible applicants (A4) Lexicographic preferences over assignments
Equilibrium characterization
The revelation game induced by the centralized procedure consists of students simultaneously submitting three preference rankings. The outcome function associates to each strategy profile the corresponding outcome of the German admissions procedure. In line with my assumptions,
I keep the sets of applicants and universities, the vector of quotas q = (q u ) u∈U , and the three profiles of priority/preference orderings t = ( (u,t) ) u∈U , t = 1, 2, 3, fixed and will only make explicit reference to these exogenous variables when necessary.
To define the revelation game between applicants formally, let the set of admissible strategies for applicant a consist of three-tuples of rankings
a ), such that, for t ∈ {1, 3}, Q t a is an ordered list containing at least one and at most six universities in order of decreasing preference, and Q 2 a is an ordered list containing at least one university. Let Q a denote the set of admissible strategies and Q = × a∈A Q a be the set of all strategy profiles. Given a profile of applicant reports Q ∈ Q, let f
) be the outcome produced by the centralized admissions procedure when the profile of reports is Q. 16 Given an arbitrary profile of strict preferences of the applicants, P A , I will now characterize the set of pure strategy Nash-equilibrium outcomes of the revelation game induced by the admissions procedure. The characterization is based on the following notion of stability.
Definition 2. An outcome µ = (µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ) is stable with respect to P A if (i) no applicant receives a place for which she is not eligible, that is, for all t ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all u ∈ U ,a (u,t) u for all a ∈ µ t (u), 16 Note that f Gt (Q) also depends on t . Given that universities' priorities and preferences are assumed fixed, I suppress this dependency in the following.
(ii) no applicant is matched to an unacceptable university, that is, µ(a)R a a, for all a ∈ A, (iii) there is no applicant-university pair that blocks µ, that is, there is no pair (a, u) such that uP a µ(a) and, for some t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, either (a (u,t) u and r (u,t) (µ) > 0) or (a (u,t)ã for someã ∈ µ t (u)).
(iv) applicants are matched as early as possible, that is, if µ 3 (a) = u for some university u there is no t ∈ {1, 2} such that either (a (u,t) u and r (u,t) (µ) > 0), or (a (u,t)ã for some applicantã ∈ µ t (u)).
This definition of stability takes into account that different criteria are used to regulate admission in the three parts of the assignment procedure. Part (iv) of this definition ensures that in case of multiple possibilities of admission at a university, an applicant takes the place that was intended for her. Finally, note that this definition of stability takes into account that places reserved for, but not taken by top-grade and wait-time applicants can be allocated according to universities' criteria. The following is the main result of this section. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game induced by the German admissions procedure coincides with the set of stable outcomes with respect to P A .
While this result is related to the equilibrium characterizations for the Boston mechanism
by Ergin and Sönmez (2006) and for the revelation game induced by the CDA by Sotomayor (2007), its proof is significantly more difficult due to the sequential nature of the German admissions procedure and the possibility of capacity redistribution. To get some intuition (the formal proof is in the Appendix) for this result, suppose a top-grade applicant a is matched in the first part of the German admissions procedure but could be admitted at some strictly preferred university u in part 3 (given the set of applicants admitted in that part). In this case a could profitably deviate by ranking only u for each part of the procedure: Since a was matched in the first part under her original report, only a subset of applicants have to wait for part 3 when she deviates in the just described way. But this implies that all universities make more offers in the CDA of part 3 and in particular a must receive an offer by u given the assumed instability. In the next example, I calculate the set of stable matchings for a simple example. Example 1. Consider again the setting of the example in section 3.1. The following are the only two stable outcomes:
, and
By Theorem 1, there are thus two pure strategy equilibrium outcomes of the revelation game among applicants. Note that all applicants weakly prefer µ over ν. One strategy profile that implements the first matching is the following: All top-grade applicants (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) rank only their most preferred university for part 1 and submit their true ranking for part 3. Wait-time applicants (a 7 , a 8 , a 9 ) rank only their assignment under the stable matching µ for part 2. The remaining three applicants (a 4 , a 5 , a 6 ) rank only their most preferred university for part 3. For a 2 this means that she truncates her true preferences so that she will stay in the procedure until part 3, where she can be assigned a place at her most preferred university u 1 given the reports of the others. Wait-time applicants on the other hand, overreport their preferences in fear of falling through the cracks in the Boston mechanism of part 2 and knowing that their chances of obtaining a more preferred university in part 3 are slim. The empirical analysis in Braun et al. (2010) suggests that such strategies are indeed used since top-grade applicants' lists for the first part are significantly shorter than wait-time applicants' lists for the second part.
However, note that a 2 is guaranteed to obtain a place at u 3 in part 1 if she ranks this university first -irrespective of the reports of the other applicants. On the other hand, a 2 has to rely on others to follow the right equilibrium strategy in order to reach the Pareto dominant equilibrium. If coordination fails, this strategy might even lead to a 2 being assigned to her third choice u 2 . 17 In this sense the Pareto dominant equilibrium is more risky for a 2 so that she might be inclined to use the safe strategy of over-reporting her preference for u 3 in part 1.
Theorem 1 shows that the potential instabilities of the centralized admissions procedure we saw in Example 1 are "corrected" by the strategic behavior of applicants. This will prove to be a useful benchmark for a comparison between my proposed redesign and the current procedure in Section 4. We will later see that the set of stable outcomes for the university admissions problem coincides with the set of stable matchings for a related college admissions problem with substitutable preferences. 18 Since for such problems there exists a student/applicant optimal stable matching that all students/applicants (weakly) prefer to any other stable matching, this implies that the German admission procedure supports Pareto dominated outcomes, as was already exemplified above.
I conclude this section with a discussion of the influence of universities' evaluation criteria on the equilibrium characterization of Theorem 1. In the actual procedure universities are allowed to use their rank in the preference lists that applicants submitted for part 3. For example, a university may decide to consider only applicants who ranked it first and order these applicants according to their average grade. Assumption (A1) above could be interpreted as saying that the other criteria a university u uses apart from such ranking constraints induces the strict ranking (u,3) . In the just mentioned example (u,3) would simply list applicants in decreasing order of average grade. The ranking (u,3) can thus be understood as the ranking that would result if all applicants had ranked u sufficiently high to satisfy its ranking constraint. While I have abstracted from ranking constraints in the above, Theorem 1 remains valid without this restriction. This follows since the proof of this result shows that any stable matching can be achieved by a strategy profile in which matched applicants only rank their assigned university and that the deviations used to show that any equilibrium outcome must be stable similarly use a preference list of length one. Thus, the ranking constraints set by universities never come into play in a complete information equilibrium. An interesting corollary of Theorem 1 is therefore that neither ranking constraints nor the constraint that applicants can rank at most six universities for parts 1 and 2, have any effect on the set of matchings that are attainable as complete information equilibrium outcomes. The application strategies used in the proof are of course very risky since they entail a potentially high probability of being left unassigned by the end of the procedure if applicants are only slightly mistaken about the preferences of universities and other applicants. The discussion is meant to point out that if applicants had a very reliable estimate of their chances of admission at each university then constraints would be irrelevant.
Towards a New Design: Matching with complex constraints
The analysis of the current German admission system showed that it provides students with strong incentives to try to manipulate the procedure by strategically misrepresenting their preferences and that strategizing by students can lead to inefficiencies. But are there matching mechanisms that are immune to strategic manipulation by students and at the same time achieve a satisfactory allocative performance? Since top-grade applicants are, in principle, also eligible to obtain one of the places that universities are allowed to assign according to their own criteria, immunity to manipulations by applicants requires all places at each university to be allocated simultaneously. For example, even when the three assignment procedures in the current German admissions procedure were abandoned in favor of the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, the resulting direct mechanism would not be strategy-proof for top-grade applicants if the sequential structure is maintained: These applicants would still sometimes have an incentive to submit short preference lists in order to not forfeit their chances in the third part of the procedure. An important problem in developing an appealing alternative admission system is thus to find ways of reconciling the simultaneous allocation of all seats with the institutional constraint that some places are reserved for special student groups and should only become available to other students if there is insufficient demand from these groups.
This institutional constraint is an important cornerstone of the German university admissions system: The quota for top-grade students represents the political will to give prioritized access to the very best high school graduates. The quota for wait-time students on the other hand is necessary in order for the admissions process to satisfy the constitutional requirement that every applicant with the appropriate qualification (i.e. having successfully finished secondary school) should have a chance of studying any subject she wants. Constraints similar to those of the German admissions system also play an important role in school choice. Here, public schools often have a desire to achieve some target distribution of student types in its entering class (e.g.
an even distribution of sexes) but cannot afford to waste capacity to achieve this distributional goal. Hence, a school will sometimes have to accept violations of its affirmative action policy.
However, a school may prefer some violations over others and it is thus important to provide it with enough flexibility to express such preferences. This issue has not been studied in the previous matching literature. Major differences to other matching problems with constraints that have been studied in the existing literature are discussed in section 5.2.
I now introduce a general class of matching problems with complex constraints that can accommodate both of the applications mentioned above. Formally, a matching problem with complex constraints consists of
• a finite set of students I,
• for each student i ∈ I, a strict ordering P i of C ∪ {i}
• for each college c a choice protocol consisting of The idea behind this class of problems is that a college c may decide or be required to reserve certain parts of its capacity for special student groups (e.g. siblings, students with excellent average grades, and so on) and may want to make some of these reserved seats available to other student groups to accommodate to the characteristics of applicants. Such constraints are encoded in the choice protocol of c: First, it specifies an order in which special student groups are to be considered, where the tth group to be considered is the set of acceptable students with respect to (c,t) . Note that a student may belong to multiple special student groups, so that ( (c,t) ) t may not partition the set of students into disjoint acceptable subgroups. In particular, a given student may be considered multiple times by a choice protocol. Secondly, it dictates how much capacity is reserved for each group as a function of seats left vacant by groups considered earlier, starting from some fixed value for the first group to be considered. I will usually refer to the sequence (q (c,t) (0, . . . , 0)) Tc t=1 as the target distribution of college c. The idea behind this is that college c initially intends to allocate q c := t q (c,t) (0, . . . , 0) places and has a strict preference for filling these places according to its target distribution. If its target distribution cannot be achieved because too few students from one or more of the T c student groups apply, a college can express its preferences over possible alternate distributions of student groups by specifying how capacity is to be redistributed through its choice of the functions q (c,t) . For my purpose it is without loss of generality to assume that T c = T c for all colleges c, c (since we can always set q (c,t) (r 1 , . . . , r t−1 ) ≡ 0 if t > T c ) and I will henceforth let T denote the common final step of all colleges' choice protocols. Finally, note that the above formulation implicitly assumes that there are no specific advantages or disadvantages associated with being admitted because one belongs to a particular special student group so that students do not care about the type of place they receive, but only about their assigned colleges. I now illustrate these concepts by a simple but important practical example Example 2 (Siblings and affirmative action constraints). Consider a school (college) c with a fixed number of total seats q c . Suppose the school has to offer admittance to students who have a sibling already attending the school. If possible, the school then wants to distribute any remaining capacity equally among male and female students.
This can be implemented by a choice protocol as follows: First, let 1 be some strict ordering of I ∪ {c} such that only students with siblings attending c are acceptable. Next, let 2 be a strict ranking such that only male students are acceptable and 3 be a strict ranking such that only female students are acceptable. To complete the description of the choice protocol, let q 1 ≡ q c . If l 1 < q 1 students with siblings apply, r 1 := q 1 − l 1 can be allocated among remaining applicants. To ensure that seats not taken by students with siblings are distributed (approximately) equally between male and female students, set q 2 (r 1 ) = .
I now proceed to define a concept of stability adapted to matching problems with complex constraints. A matching sequence is a finite sequence of matchings µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ T ) such that for all t ≤ T , µ t is a matching of students and colleges. Given a matching sequence µ, define the associated sequence of empty seats by first setting r (c,1) (µ) := q (c,1) − |µ 1 (c)|, and then, assuming that r (c,1) (µ), . . . , r (c,t−1) (µ) have already been defined, r (c,t) (µ) := ,1) (µ) , . . . , r (c,t−1) (µ))−|µ t (c)|. I now define a notion of feasibility with respect to a given profile of choice protocols.
Definition 3. Given a profile of choice protocols
(ii) for all t and c, r (c,t) (µ) ≥ 0.
Feasibility requires that each student is matched to at most one college and that all capacity constraints of all colleges are satisfied. Given a feasible matching sequence µ let student i's
a place in quota t of college c (und µ), if i ∈ µ t (c) and the set of students matched to c is µ(c) := ∪ t µ t (c). I now define a concept of stability that is adapted to the specific structure of a matching problem with complex constraints. A feasible matching sequence µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ T ) is procedurally stable with respect to a profile P I of student preferences, if
then there is no t such that i (c,t) c and either r (c,t) (µ) > 0, or i (c,t) j for some j ∈ µ t (c), and (iv) if i ∈ µ t (c), there is no s < t such that i (c,s) c and either r (c,s) (µ) > 0, or i (c,s) j for some j ∈ µ s (c).
Condition (i) is the standard individual rationality constraint for students. Condition (ii)
requires that a college's desire to restrict certain parts of its capacity to special student groups is respected. Condition (iii) requires that a matching sequence is not blocked by a studentcollege (i, c) pair in the sense that i strictly prefers c to her allocation under µ, and that c would strictly prefer to admit i in at least one of its quotas given the matching sequence. Note that whether i and c form a blocking pair does not only depend on the set of students matched to c, but also on the particular distribution of these students across c's different quotas. Finally, condition (iv) requires that a student who receives a place in quota t of college c could not have been admitted in an earlier quota given the set of applicants µ(c). This requirement can be understood as a desire to stay as close as possible to the target distribution since the more students take the places that were intended for them (i.e. the earliest quota in which they can be admitted), the less capacity redistribution. The concept of procedural stability is a natural and desirable allocative criterion in the spirit of the stability concepts that have been used in theory and practical applications of matching models. The next example shows that a procedurally stable matching does not always exist.
Example 3. There are two colleges c 1 , c 2 , and two students i 1 , i 2 . The choice protocols of the two colleges are given by
Note that the target capacity of c 1 is two, while the target capacity for c 2 is one. Now suppose students' preferences are given by P i 1 : c 2 , c 1 and
Then no procedurally stable matching exists: Suppose first that both students are matched to c 1 . Then i 1 would strictly prefer to be matched to c 2 and c 2 has one place available, so that the matching could not have been stable. If only one student is matched to c 1 , it must be i 1 .
In this case, however, i 2 and c 1 would block the matching. Finally, if no student is matched to c 1 , we must have that i 2 is matched to c 2 , as otherwise they would block the matching. But then i 1 and c 1 would block the matching.
19
Thus, in order to guarantee the existence of a procedurally stable matching, one has to restrict choice protocols. I now introduce two independent restrictions, which guarantee that situations such as in the example cannot occur. 19 The problem in this example is that students i 1 and i 2 are complements for college c 1 in the sense that it wants to admit i 2 only if it is able to attract i 1 as well. It is by now well known (see Hatfield and Milgrom 2005 , and Hatfield and Kojima 2009) that in presence of complementarities stable matchings may fail to exist.
Definition 5. (i)
(ii)
The first requirement is that whenever weakly more seats are left unassigned in every quota from 1 to t − 1, weakly more quota t seats should be made available to applicants. The second requirement says that in response to greater demand in steps 1 through t − 1, students should not suffer too much in the sense that the total capacity reduction in steps 1 up to and including
should not exceed the increase in demand in quotas 1 up to t, t−1 s=1 k s . The first requirement rules out a situation such as the one in Example 3. The second requirement basically rules out applications in which a college would like to decrease total capacity in response to increased demand in some quotas. This may be relevant in particular for applications to school choice, where a school may reserve some part of its capacity for students with, say, low reading scores. If students with lower reading scores demand more attention than students with higher reading scores, a school may prefer to reduce the number of seats available to other students by, say, two for each additional student with low reading scores. The following is the main result of this section. Then for each profile of student preferences P I , there exists a unique student optimal procedurally stable matching, denoted by f I (P I ).
(ii) Suppose all choice protocols are monotonic and consistent.
Then the direct mechanism f I is group strategy-proof for students.
The proof of this theorem, the formal argument can be found in the Appendix, rests on a transformation of a matching problem with complex constraints to an associated college admissions problem (CAP), where choice protocols are eliminated from the description of the problem. For any profile of choice protocols, stability in this associated CAP turns out to be equivalent to procedural stability. If choice protocols are monotonic, college preferences in the associated CAP satisfy substitutability. If choice protocols are monotonic and consistent, college preferences also satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Hence, Theorem 2 can be derived using Theorem A of Section 2.
Note that the choice protocol in Example 2 is consistent and monotonic: Any place initially reserved for siblings becomes available to other students if there is insufficient demand from these groups, so that the choice protocol is monotonic. For each additional sibling admitted, the number of remaining places available for male and female students is reduced by at most one, so that the choice protocol is also consistent. I now discuss how to embed the German system into the framework developed in this section.
Application to the German System
Assume throughout this section, that universities have objective evaluation procedures (cf.
Assumption ( This policy can be implemented as a matching problem with complex constraints where the choice protocol of a university u is given by u := ( (u,1) , (u,2) , (u,3) ), q (u,1) ≡ q (u,2) (r 1 ) ≡ q u + r 1 + r 2 . These choice protocols are clearly monotonic and consistent.
Since procedural stability is equivalent to the notion of stability introduced in Definition 1, we obtain the following corollary to Theorems 1 and 2. (ii) The direct mechanism f A is group strategy-proof for applicants.
Thus, applicants are unambiguously better off under the applicant optimal procedurally stable matching mechanisms than under the current German matching mechanism. Note that in the alternative mechanism, applicants submit only one preference list, as opposed to the three lists they can submit in the current German admissions procedure.
To develop some intuition for the above result, it is helpful to consider how a university u determines who to (temporarily) accept when applicants in B ⊆ A apply to it in some step of the SDA used to compute the applicant optimal procedurally stable matching:
(1) Among applicants in B, temporarily accept the q (u,1) highest ranking top-grade applicants with respect to (u,1) .
Let B 1 be the set of temporarily accepted applicants, B 2 = B \ B 1 , and r 1 = q (u,1) − |B 1 |.
(2) Among applicants in B 2 , temporarily accept the q (u,2) highest ranking wait-time applicants with respect to (u,2) .
Let B 2 be the set of temporarily admitted applicants, B 3 = B 2 \ B 2 , and r 2 = q (u,2) −|B 2 |. q u + r 1 + r 2 highest ranking acceptable applicants with respect to (u,3) .
Let B 3 be the set of temporarily admitted applicants.
This mimics the current admissions procedure in the sense that an applicant's admission chances are always checked in the order top-grade/wait-time/general admissions. However, in contrast to the current German admissions procedure top-grade and wait-time applicants can claim one of the places initially reserved for them in any round of the assignment procedure.
In particular, those applicants never have an incentive to over-report their preference for a university in order to "match early" and thus avoid losing their guaranteed priority. This may free up additional capacity that can be allocated on basis of universities' criteria, potentially leading to better assignments for those applicants not eligible for top-grade or wait-time places.
While one may worry that increased competition from top-grade and wait-time applicants can also be harmful to other applicants, this can never happen: In an equilibrium of the current German admissions procedure, it can never be beneficial for a top-grade applicant matched in the first part to displace an applicant who was matched in the third part of the procedure due to Theorem 1.
Other matching problems with constraints
I now discuss some other approaches to and models of matching models with constraints to outline the most important differences. For the discussion, fix a profile of monotonic and consistent choice protocols ( c , q c ) c∈C where for each c ∈ C, ( c , q c ) = ( (c,t) , q (c,t) ) T t=1 . Suppose first that for all c, c ∈ C and each t, the set of acceptable students with respect to (c,t) is the same as the set of acceptable students with respect to (c ,t) . In this case, say that student s has characteristic t, if he or she is acceptable with respect to (c,t) for all c ∈ C. Note that at least q (c,t) := q (c,t) (0, . . . , 0) places are exclusively reserved for students having characteristic t given the monotonicity of choice protocols. Even for this special case a matching problem with complex constraints cannot be reduced to a college admissions problem with responsive preferences. First, a procedurally stable outcome cannot in general be achieved by splitting each college into T "mini" colleges c 1 , . . . , c T with capacities q (c,1) , . . . , q (c,t) and "preferences"
(c,1) , . . . , (c,T ) , and then running separate assignment procedures for each characteristic. This approach is only guaranteed to work if students have at most one characteristic and if capacity cannot be redistributed. Second, it is not in general possible to eliminate the possibility of capacity redistribution by modifying colleges' priority/preference orderings. This would only be feasible if, for all characteristics t and all colleges c, there is an ordering t = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t n such that, for all j, all places that c initially reserved for students with characteristic t are supposed to become available to students with characteristic t j+1 whenever there is insufficient demand from students with characteristics t 0 , . . . , t j . In this case capacity redistribution can be accommodated by replacing (c,t) with a ranking (c,t) which ranks all students with characteristics t 0 , . . . , t n as acceptable and ranks all students with characteristic t j who do not have characteristics t 0 , . . . , t j−1 below all students who have at least one of those characteristics.
This approach is no longer feasible if, as in Example 3, remaining seats for some characteristics are supposed to be split between several other characteristics.
Next, consider the matching problem with affirmative action constraints of Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) and Abdulkadiroglu (2005) . In this problem, each school c has a fixed upper bound q c on the total number of students it can admit and evaluates all individual students according to the same preference ordering P c . Each student i has one characteristic τ (i) (e.g. being male or female or belonging to a minority) and for each characteristic t ∈ T := ∪ i∈I {τ (i)} each school c has a fixed upper bound q t c on the number of students with characteristic t it is willing to admit. 20 Abdulkadiroglu (2005) shows how the SDA can be modified to cope with such affirmative constraints while maintaining its desirable allocative and incentive properties. The main differences between matching problems with affirmative action constraints and matching problems with complex constraints are that in the latter (1) seats are exclusively reserved for students that have the corresponding characteristic, (2) students may have more than one characteristic, and (3) capacity may be redistributed between different type-specific quotas.
This is not meant to imply that the matching problem considered in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) and Abdulkadiroglu (2005) is a special case of the matching problem with complex constraints considered here. Rather, matching problems with complex constraints are better suited for applications where the main concern is to achieve a particular distribution of student characteristics and schools have preferences over how capacity is to be redistributed between quotas if the desired distribution cannot be met. Matching problems with affirmative action constraints on the other hand are better suited when the main concern is to limit the number of students with a given characteristic.
Finally, I compare matching problems with complex constraints to the model of matching with regional caps introduced by Kamada and Kojima (2011) . In their model each college (hospital in their paper) belongs to a region, each region has a cap on the total number of students that can be admitted by its colleges, and students have strict preferences over colleges (and the option of remaining unmatched). In addition, each region has preferences over how its capacity is to be distributed among its colleges. This problem is conceptually similar to a matching problem with complex constraints in the sense that regional capacities are fixed, but 20 For a model in which each school has a lower and an upper bound for each type see Ehlers (2010) .
the capacity of a given college c depends on how many students apply to the different colleges in c's region. However, a crucial difference is that in the application of Kamada and Kojima, students have strict preferences over individual colleges, whereas in a matching problem with complex constraints students are indifferent about which type of place they receive. In particular, their techniques for transforming a matching model with constraints to a two-sided matching problem with contracts cannot be applied to matching problem with complex constraints. It should be stressed at this point, however, that their model is neither more nor less general than the model I consider here.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper analyzed the assignment procedure that is used to allocate places at public universities for medicine and related subjects in Germany. The procedure uses two mechanisms, the Boston and the college optimal stable mechanism, that have been studied extensively in the matching literature. Assuming universities are not strategic, it was shown that complete information equilibria are characterized by a stability notion which takes the specific constraints of the German university admissions system into account.
To develop an alternative assignment mechanism, I introduced matching problems with complex constraints where college preferences are represented by choice protocols. It was shown that if these protocols are monotonic and consistent, a matching problem with complex constraints gives rise to a well defined associated college admissions problem for which a group strategy-proof (for students) and stable assignment procedure exists. I then showed that the German university admissions problem can be understood as matching problem with complex constraints in which colleges' choice protocols are monotonic and consistent. This implies in particular that the applicant optimal stable mechanism for the associated college admissions problem (i) provides (groups of) applicants with dominant strategy incentives for truthful preference revelation, and (ii) produces a matching that Pareto dominates (with respect to applicant preferences) any pure strategy equilibrium of the current admissions procedure.
The desirable properties of the alternative mechanism outlined above depend on the assumptions that (1) applicants can rank an arbitrary number of universities, (2) universities are not allowed to condition their rankings on applicants' submitted preferences, and (3) universities evaluate all applicants prior to the start of the procedure. The added complexity of allowing all applicants to rank an arbitrary number of universities should not be problematic, in particular, since wait-time applicants are already allowed to rank an arbitrary number of universities in the current procedure. Abandoning ranking constraints by universities is reasonable, since, as shown in section 4.2, they have no effect on the set of (complete information) equilibrium outcomes of the current procedure anyway. Forcing universities to evaluate all applicants prior to the start of the procedure might be problematic if evaluation is costly, as in case it is based on interviewing applicants. For example, a university may interview an applicant who ends up taking one of the places reserved for top-grade applicants. While such wasteful investment into the evaluation of applicants can occur in the alternative mechanism, universities will usually have a good estimate of whether it makes sense for them to interview top-grade or wait-time applicants. Furthermore, the above mechanism could be augmented by allowing applicants to send a signal to one of the universities that they are interested in being interviewed. As in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2008) , this would preserve ordinal strategyproofness of the alternative mechanism and would alleviate the problem of wasteful investments since universities could restrict attention to evaluating those top-grade applicants who signaled their interest.
APPENDIX.

A Proof of Theorem 1:
I show first that for any profile of strict applicant preferences P A , if Q is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the German admissions procedure then f G (Q) must be a stable outcome at P A . Note that stability condition (i) is satisfied since by (A3) no applicant ever submits an empty preference list for one of the parts of the procedure. Stability condition (ii) is satisfied, since applicants can only be matched to a university that is on their submitted preference lists and it can thus never be optimal for an applicant to end up matched to an unacceptable university. Stability conditions (iv) and (iii) for t ∈ {1, 2} follow since applicants prefer to be matched as early as possible and since an eligible applicant who ranks a university u first for part t ∈ {1, 2} is guaranteed to receive a place at u unless q t u or more applicants with higher t-priority for u rank it first for this part.
Now suppose that f G (Q) := (µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ) violates (iii) for t = 3 and satisfies all remaining stability conditions. Let (a, u) be a pair such that uP a µ(a) and, for some t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, either (a (u,3) u and r (u,3) (µ) > 0) or (a (u,3)ã for someã ∈ µ 3 (u)). I will show that Q cannot be a Nash-equilibrium.
LetQ a be an alternative report for applicant a that lists only u for each part of the procedure. Let Q = (Q a , Q −a ) and f G (Q) = (μ 1 ,μ 2 ,μ 3 ). It is clear that unlessμ(a) = a,Q a is a profitable deviation for a. I now show thatμ(a) = a is impossible. Assume the contrary and let A 3 andÃ 3 denote the sets of applicants apart from a who remain in the procedure by the beginning of part 3 under Q andQ, respectively. Note thatμ(a) = a impliesÃ 3 ⊆ A 3 , q 3 u (μ) = q 3 u (µ), and q 3 v (μ) ≥ q 3 v (µ) for all v ∈ U \{u}.
This implies that if a does not receive an offer by u in the course of the CDA underQ, all applicants inÃ 3 receive a superset of the set of offers they got when the profile of submitted preferences was Q.
In particular, any applicant inÃ 3 who received and declined an offer by u in the CDA under Q will also decline an offer by u in the CDA underQ. Hence, if r (u,3) (µ) > 0, we would have r (u,3) (μ) > 0 as well. Given that (a, u) blocks µ, u must have made an offer to a in the CDA underQ. This implies |µ 3 (u)| = q 3 u . Since (iv) is violated, there has to be an applicantã ∈ µ 3 (u) such that a (u,3)ã . Given the above, for any applicantâ such thatâ (u,3)ã andâ / ∈ µ 3 (u) we must also haveâ / ∈μ 3 (u). But thenμ 3 (u) has to contain at least one applicant who ranks strictly lower on (u,3) than a and u would have made an offer to a in the CDA underQ, a contradiction. Now let µ = (µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ) be a stable outcome with respect to P A . If µ(a) = a, let a rank her six most preferred acceptable universities according to P a for parts 1 and 3, and all acceptable universities for part 2. If µ(a) = u, let a rank only u for all steps of the procedure. Let Q be the resulting strategy profile.
I show first that f G (Q) = µ. Let f G (Q) = (μ 1 ,μ 2 ,μ 3 ). It is easy to see that (iii) and (iv) implỹ µ 1 = µ 1 andμ 2 = µ 2 . Given this, any applicant a with µ 3 (a) ∈ U will not be assigned in parts 1 or 2 of the centralized procedure under Q. Since all of these applicants rank only their assigned university under µ 3 for part 3 while all other unassigned applicants rank their six most preferred acceptable universities (w.r.t. P A ), (iii) would be violated if one of the unassigned applicants received a place in part 3 of the centralized procedure under Q. Hence, we must have µ 3 =μ 3 .
Next, I show that Q is a Nash equilibrium profile. LetQ a be an alternative report for applicant a, Q = (Q a , Q −a ), and f GA (Q) = (μ 1 ,μ 2 ,μ 3 ). Note that the sets of top-grade and wait-time applicants are the same as under Q since, for t ∈ {1, 2},Q t a contains at least one university by (A3). Note that it cannot be the case thatμ t (a) = u = µ 3 (a) for some t ∈ {1, 2} since all applicants in µ t (u) apply to u in the first round of the Boston mechanism underQ so that µ could not satisfy (iii) or (iv) otherwise.
A similar argument shows that a cannot obtain a university strictly to µ(a) according to P a in parts 1 or 2. It remains to be shown that a cannot strictly preferμ 3 (a) over µ(a). Consider first an applicant a such that µ 1 (a) = µ 2 (a) = a. Given that µ satisfies (iii) and (iv) (and given the construction of Q), no alternative reportQ a that leads to different assignments in parts 1 or 2 can be profitable for a. We can hence assume w.l.o.g. thatQ 1 a = Q 1 a andQ 2 a = Q 2 a . But then ifμ 3 (a)P a µ 3 (a) we obtain an immediate contradiction to (iii) for t = 3 since all applicants in µ 3 (u) are available in part 3 of the centralized procedure underQ and rank only u. Now consider an applicant a such that for some u ∈ U , µ 1 (a) = u (a completely analogous argument takes care of the case where an applicant is matched in the second part). By (A3), a can never obtain a place at some university in part 2. By (iii) and the construction of Q, there is no alternative report for a such that she obtains a strictly preferred university in part 1 according to P a . Thus the only way that a could potentially improve upon her assignment under µ is thatμ 1 (a) = a(=μ 2 (a)). But the only applicants who could take the leftover seat at u in part 1 are those who are either unassigned under µ or who are matched to u under µ 3 . In particular, for all universities v = u, all applicants in µ 3 (v) remain in the procedure by the beginning of part 3 underQ andq 3 v = q 3 v . Ifμ 3 (a)P a u, we must thus obtain a contradiction to (iii). This completes the proof.
matching ν for the associated CAP, define a feasible matching sequence µ ν by setting µ ν t (c) = I (c,t) (ν(c)) for all c ∈ C and, for all i ∈ I, µ ν t (i) = c if i ∈ I (c,t) (ν(c)) for some c ∈ C and µ ν t (i) = i if i / ∈ ∪ c∈C I (c,t) (ν(c)).
Given these definitions, it is straightforward to check that if µ is procedurally stable, then ν µ is stable for the associated simple problem, and that if ν is stable for the associated simple problem, then µ ν = (µ ν 1 , . . . , µ ν T ) is procedurally stable (a formal proof can be found in the Online Appendix).
This implies that if ν is the student optimal stable matching in the associated CAP, then µ ν is the student optimal procedurally stable matching for the matching problem with complex constraints.
Step 3: Monotonicity of choice protocols implies substitutability of colleges' choice functions in the associated CAP For the following, fix some college c ∈ C with choice protocol ( c , q c ). SupposeJ ⊆ J ⊆ I. Let (J t ,r t ,J t+1 ) t and (J t , r t , J t+1 ) t denote the associated sequences of admitted students, remaining capacities, and remaining students for each step of c's admission process from J and J, respectively.
I show first that if ( c , q c ) is monotonic, then Ch(·| c , q c ) is substitutable. To prove this, I
show by induction that (J t ∩J t ) ⊆J t .
The statement is trivial for t = 1. Furthermore, it is easy to see that we must have r 1 ≤r 1 . So suppose that for some t ≥ 1, (J s ∩J s ) ⊆J s and r s ≤r s for all s ≤ t. I show that the same statements hold for t + 1 as well.
Note first that by the inductive assumption we must haveJ t+1 ⊆ J t+1 : Otherwise there would be an agent i ∈ (J 1 ∪ . . . ∪ J t ) ∩J t+1 , which is impossible given the inductive assumption of (J s ∩J s ) ⊆J s for all s ≤ t. By monotonicity and the inductive assumption we obtain that q t+1 := q (c,t+1) (r 1 , . . . , r t ) ≤ q (c,t+1) (r 1 , . . . ,r t ) =:q t+1 . This already yields (J t+1 ∩J t+1 ) ⊆J t+1 , sinceJ t+1 ⊆ J t+1 together withq t+1 ≥ q t+1 implies that theq t+1 st lowest ranking applicant iñ J t+1 with respect (c,t+1) must rank weakly lower than the q t+1 st lowest ranking applicant in
It remains to be shown that r t+1 ≤r t+1 . By definitionr t+1 − r t+1 =q t+1 − q t+1 + |J t+1 | − |J t+1 |.
If |J t+1 | < q t+1 , note thatJ t+1 ⊆ J t+1 implies |J t+1 | = |{i ∈ J t+1 : i (c,t+1) c}| ≥ |{i ∈J t+1 :
i (c,t+1) c}|. Sinceq t+1 ≥ q t+1 this implies |J t+1 | ≥ |{i ∈J t+1 : i (c,t+1) c}| = |J t+1 | and we
